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Abstract 
Cloud computing means different things to different people. It is another way of outsourcing and aggregating any computational 
hardware service provided over the Internet. It can able to share resources among multiple mutually wariness clients. While there 
are scads of asset to this system, this sort of resource sharing permit new forms of information leakage across virtual machines. In 
this paper, we interrogate the time information parameter leakage through cache based side-channel attack and the usage of CPU-
cache based side-channels in the cloud. Finally we developed a novel approach which is necessary to mitigate these kinds of 
attacks in the cloud environment, and correlated to traditional cloud technology. 
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1. Introduction 
Cloud computing is a new paradigm shift with service models in distributed computing and has acquired greater 
attention in the research communities. It is a model for enabling convenient, on-demand network access to a shared 
pool of configurable computing resources (i.e., networks, servers, storage, applications and other services) that can 
be rapidly provisioned and released with minimal management effort or service provider interaction. It can also 
provide on-demand services to users based on the distributed and virtualization technologies. Thus cloud has the 
concept of Mutually Distrusting co-resident Clients. Unlike most other standards, cloud computing permits 
potentially pernicious or inimical clients access to the same hardware. Specifically, access to the same hardware 
makes them chance to exploit the physical properties of the machine for communication or information leakage. 
Exploiting these properties is called using a hardware-based side-channel [3]. It typically involves correlating the 
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
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software’s higher level functionality with the underlying hardware phenomena. The attacker exploits co-resident 
systems by presuming software functionality from observed hardware phenomena. With an established correlation, 
these phenomena can be analysed to infer what is occurring within the software program at a given time. While 
virtualization and other technologies are heavily used in cloud systems [4], they do not fully prevent information 
leakage along these channels. Currently cache-based side-channel attacks are considered to be the most dangerous, 
among side-channel attacks. They have recently been used to extract private keys in a Cloud environment [8] and 
precipitate high-bandwidth information leakage [12]. Since the potential for these attacks has been exposed, there 
have been several attempts to reduce such situations. Unfortunately, the solution like cache flushing [2] makes the 
cache useless in its functionality. And it also make huge data lose and expensive too. There are other solutions which 
either require the client to modify their software [5], [6], or the underlying hardware [7]. From our studies of cloud 
systems, we believe that either of these modifications disrupts the relationship between the cloud provider and their 
users, which we refer to in this paper as the “cloud model”. We see the lack of an existing, non-intrusive solution to 
these attacks to be the motivation behind this work. Our goal in this paper is to provide solutions that prevent cache-
based side-channels attack, more specifically preventing the time information parameter leakage in the cache in the 
cloud without affecting the cache functionality. Typically this paper concentrates in sequential side-channel. The 
major contributions of the paper are summarized as follows:  
x A study of cache-based side-channels in a cloud environment. Mainly focus on Sequential type of side channel 
attack [13].   
x Server-side defences against cache-based side channel. This includes a technique to prevent the side-channel’s 
occurrence as well as an algorithm designed to implement the technique. The algorithm applies the solution in a 
minimalistic fashion to help minimize resulting overhead. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explains the context in which these attacks occur and are 
mitigated. Section 3 describes our motivation, detailing the need for our solution, and comparing it to related work in 
the field. Section 4 specifies the details of how the attacks work. Section 5 details our approach to the problem. 
Section 6 concludes the paper. 
2. Background 
2.1. The Cloud Model 
In this paper cloud model is referred as the specific relationship between cloud providers and their users. This 
model refers to two key attributes of cloud functionality that we aim to perpetuate while making the paradigm more 
secure. The first is that users tend to run canonical software in the cloud. Often a user will either not have the 
technical skill necessary to run their workload for security purposes, or will not have access to the code to make the 
modifications necessary. Hence it does not require any software modifications by the client or on the client-end of 
the interface. The second is that cloud systems are typically built on canonical hardware, and requiring them to do 
otherwise would be financially, and structurally costly. Hence it does not require any modifications to the 
underlying hardware. With these concepts in mind, we specify the conditions for holding with the cloud model. 
2.2. Side-Channel 
Side-Channel is a mode of bypassing virtual machine for gaining information from the physical implementation 
rather than brute force or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithm. Examples include verifying if two virtual 
machines are co-resident, and more dangerously, the extraction of cryptographic private keys from unwary hosts [8]. 
Similar research into side- channels yields additional attacks that can be migrated to the cloud [3, 9, 10]. When 
attention was first drawn to side-channels [11] there were several proposals for how to mitigate their potential [3], 
[7]. Various techniques to implement these solutions, such as altering how the algorithm uses the cache, or 
customizing the hardware channel would require either the modification of the source code, the hardware, or cause 
an unacceptable amount of overhead. Cache flushing [1] also cannot consider as the solution, for traditional cache-
based side-channels because it generate large amounts of overhead and data lose. 
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2.3. Side-Channel Attack 
Side-channel attack is a form of reverse engineering. Electronic circuits and Software programs are inherently 
leaky – they produce emissions or a mean of communication as by-products that make it possible for an attacker 
without access to the circuitry itself to deduce how the circuit works and what data it is processing. Time, heat and 
electromagnetic emissions are viable sources of information for an attacker. Because these leakages do not play a 
part in the operation of the circuit itself – they are simply side effects of it working – the use of them to perform 
reverse engineering has earned the term 'side-channel analysis' or 'side-channel attack'. For networked systems, 
time-based attacks are the most feasible and have been exploited. Systems that use memory caches are particularly 
vulnerable to timing-based attacks because of the significant difference in performance of a given section of code 
based on whether accesses to the cache hit or miss and force a slower read or write to main memory. 
2.4. Cache-Based Side-Channel Attack 
A cache is a small and fast storage area used by the CPU to reduce the average time to access main memory. It 
stores copies of the most frequently used data. When the processor needs to read a location in main memory, it first 
checks to see if the data is already in the cache. If the data is already in the cache (cache hit), the processor 
immediately uses this data instead of accessing the main memory, which has a longer latency than a cache. 
Otherwise (cache miss), the data is read from the memory and a copy of it is stored in the cache. The minimum 
amount of data that can be read from the main memory into the cache at once is called a cache line or a cache block, 
i.e., each cache miss causes a cache line to be retrieved from a higher level memory. Cache attacks exploit the cache 
hits and misses that occur. It is assumed to be able to observe the total execution time of the cipher, that is the 
number of cache hits and misses are observed. This attack is based on statistical inferences. The resulting 
differences in access times for cache hits and cache misses will serve as the communication means within the 
channel. Hence from the difference in time generates time information parameter leakage. We can term it as cache-
based side channel attack. 
3. Related Work 
Earlier works have indicated that cache-based side-channels can be exploited in the Cloud to glean information. 
Such cases include determining whether two machines are co-resident [13], and the extraction of cryptographic 
private keys from incautious hosts [8]. The latter particularly validates the severity of a side-channel attack in the 
Cloud and the potential for similar attacks to migrate to a Cloud environment [10], [14]. The attention given to side-
channels in non-Cloud environments since 70s [11], there have been many solutions to the problem proposed [3], 
[7]. These include: altering the functionality of the hardware channel, disabling the hardware channel, or modifying 
the victim code to break the correlation between the program’s execution and the hardware phenomena. 
Implementing any of these defenses would require the customization of either all hardware intended for use in the 
Cloud, or else all software intended to be run in a Cloud environment. Both of these solutions conflict with the 
Cloud model, as they would either restrict the hardware requirements or the client skill level needed to use the 
Cloud. Kim et al. [5] have developed a solution for cache-based side-channels in Cloud systems. In their solution, 
they prevent cache-based side-channels by giving each VM exclusive access to a sectioned portion of the cache they 
call a stealth page. In order to have software applications access these hidden pages, their solution requires the user 
to make client-side modifications to the software being executed in the guest VM. However, we believe that 
requiring the client to modify their software violates the Cloud model and demonstrates the need for a solution 
transparent to the Client. For our solution, we implemented a purely server side defence for cache-based side-
channels in the Cloud. To make it fully compatible with the Cloud model, we impress the constraints that it both 
prevent cache-based side-channels between co-resident VMs, and that it requires no modifications of the underlying 
hardware nor of the software being run on a VM. For non-cloud environments, it has been previously suggested to 
use cache flushing as a way to prevent side channels [3]. However, the idea was always deemed prohibitively 
expensive. We believe, however, that the discrete nature of the Cloud can be exploited to create a reasonable 
solution specific to Cloud environments. In recent existing methodology [1], [2], cloud paradigm uses Cache 
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flushing in much more effective technique by exploiting knowledge of Cloud using scheduling architecture. The 
common inefficiency of the technique can be summarized in two side-effects: The reduced usefulness of the cache 
and the increased cost due to flushing the cache. Existing solution, shown in Fig. 1, is designed such that both 
parties view the cache as flushed (invalid) upon gaining access to the cache. The existing solution attempts to 
mitigate the data loss due to frequent cache flushing by only flushing the cache when the CPU switches domains. If 
they have no data in common, then flushing the data will not happen. Flushing the cache only when a context switch 
occurs between domains will significantly reduce the amount of flushes necessary. In addition, the scheduler can 
enforce specific rules for the frequency of context switching between domains. Thus the solution should prevent 
sequentially scheduled VMs from gaining any information about the previous VMs cache usage, thereby blocking 
the prospective side-channel. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Existing solution’s effect on the PTP technique. 
The technique includes two new functions within the hypervisor: One is a server run process to revert the cache 
to a blank slate (flush the cache), and the other is a tainting algorithm in the scheduler for deciding when flushing 
the cache is necessary. Algorithm was implemented to record which VMs own data currently in the cache and to 
determine when it is necessary to flush those data. The outcome of Algorithm is that a cache flush occurs only when 
a context switch changes from one domain to another where the second domain has the ability to establish a side-
channel with the first. Switching to the idle domain, or to the same domain, will not invoke a cache flush. Still the 
existing solution will reduce usefulness of the cache and increased cost due to flushing the cache other than the 
above conditions. Therefore cache flush will happens, in case of context switch between two virtual machines which 
fetch different data’s. And if first virtual machine came again to access the same files accessed before. Then it will 
face cache miss. This is the drawback of existing methodology which leads to reduced usefulness of cache and the 
increased cost. 
4. Technique 
Cache-based side-channel attacks can be categorized into two types: Sequential and Parallel. These attacks vary 
in whether they employ concurrent access to the CPU-cache or not. This paper discusses possible mitigations for a 
cache-based side-channel attack of sequential type. The first documented form of a cache-based side-channel attack 
explored in the cloud was by Ristenpart et al. [13] who demonstrated the use of side-channels to verify virtual 
machine co-residence in Amazon’s EC2. As part of their work, they explored the use of a previously identified 
cache-based side-channel technique, which they refer to as the Prime+Probe technique, in a cloud environment. The 
result of such work is the prime+trigger+probe (PTP) technique, illustrated in Fig. 2, a variation designed to work in 
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cloud environments. The purpose of their experiment, using the PTP technique, was to see if a cache-based side-
channel could be established between two guest domains in the cloud. The channel was established such that the 
first VM (referred to as the probing instance) could receive a message that the second VM (the target instance) 
encodes in its usage of the cache. The basic version of the PTP technique shown in Fig. 2 is an example of a 
sequential side-channel. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The prime+trigger+probe technique. 
In the PTP technique, the probing instance first separates the cache lines into two categories: the Touched 
category and the Untouched category. Once the categories have been established, the probing instance primes the 
cache by filling as many cache lines as it can. It then establishes an access time baseline by reading from each line in 
both categories. Having just been primed, each cache line should yield a cache hit, regardless of category, thus 
keeping the baseline access times low. This process is highlighted in the “Prime” step of Fig. 2. Having done this, 
the probing instance now has a series of values which represent how long it took to access each cache line with a 
primed cache. Once the cache has been primed, and the baseline established, the probing instance must trigger 
(context switch to) the target instance by busy looping, or otherwise giving up its time slice. When the target 
instance begins its time slice, it heavily accesses the cache lines in one of the pre-defined categories of the cache 
(the Touched category), but not the other (the Untouched category). The effect of this switch on the data can be seen 
in the Trigger step of Fig. 2. In this figure, the target instance is accessing every second cache line in an access 
pattern we have pre-defined. The resulting set of accessed lines we define as the Touched category of the cache. By 
contrast, cache lines in the untouched category were not accessed by the target instance. When the CPU core context 
switches back to the probing instance, the instance probes the cache by re-measuring the access times for each line. 
This is illustrated in the Probe step of Fig. 2. If there is a significant increase in the access times for cache lines in 
the touched category compared to the untouched category, then the probing instance can assume that the target 
instance was trying to communicate.  
5. Our Approach 
5.1. Over View 
The existing solution to all sequential cache-based side-channels is to avoid both the probing and the target 
instances from different cache access time. Since access to cache cannot be denied to either instances. Our solution 
focuses on disabling the difference in access time other than through cache flush, which reduces usefulness of the 
cache and increase cost and data loss. Thus our solution is to use cache wait function. The objective of our solution 
237 U.K. Muhammed Sadique and Divya James /  Procedia Technology  25 ( 2016 )  232 – 239 
is to prevent time information parameter leakage in the cache of the cloud. More specifically, if virtual machines 
cannot generate differences in access time, that is, time between the cache hit and the cache miss. Then the problem 
can be solved. 
5.2. Expected Issues and Mitigations 
The common expected issues for inefficiency can be summarized in three side-effects of the implementation: The 
reduced usefulness of the cache, the increased cost and the data lose due to flushing the cache. When the cache is 
flushed, all data held within is expunged, making the cache useless until it once again has relevant data stored 
within. The more often these flushes occur the less likely there is to be relevant data in the cache when it is accessed. 
When cache-based side-channels were being investigated in a non-virtualized environment, flushing the cache was 
deemed too expensive for general use [3]. Our solution attempts to mitigate the data loss due to cache flushing, is by 
waiting the cache execution when the CPU switches domains under single condition. When proper isolation between 
VMs is enforced, one domain should not have any cache data in common with another. The second issue relies on 
implementing a solution with a minimal amount of overhead, which will usually rely on the hardware. Waiting the 
cache execution only when a context switch occurs between domains under single condition will significantly 
increase the usefulness and reduce cost and data loss of cache.  
5.3. Implementation Technique  
Our solution to sequential side-channels involves the incorporation of our cache wait technique into a canonical 
cloud system. The technique includes two new functions within the hypervisor: One is a server run process to make 
the cache execution to a wait stage (cache-wait), and the other is a tainting algorithm in the scheduler for deciding 
when waiting the cache execution is necessary. 
Fig. 3. Our solution’s effect on the PTP technique. 
5.3.1. Cache-Wait Function 
 
Cache-Wait function waits the cache execution for the specific time. Cache-Wait operates only in one condition. 
When the context switch happens and the current domain requires data, both from the cache memory (cache hit) and 
the main memory (cache miss). And if the total time required for accessing the main memory is higher than the 
cache memory. Only at this particular instant, the Cache-Wait function operates Fig 3. That is, when context switch 
happens and the current VM performs cache hit and cache miss. And if the time taken for the cache miss is greater 
than the cache hit, at this instant Cache-Wait operates. The function is such that Cache-Wait will hold the cache 
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execution process for the specific time. The specific time is determined from the difference in the accessing time 
required for fetching data from the main memory and the cache memory. That is, the difference in accessing time 
required between cache miss and cache hit. 
5.3.2. Decision Algorithm 
 
Flushing a high level cache on a modern machine can be a time consuming process. As mentioned in the above 
section, it is better to wait the cache and also only when it is necessary. When context switch happens and the 
current VM performs cache hit and cache miss. And if the time taken for the cache miss is greater than the cache hit, 
at this instant Cache-Wait operates. Algorithm 1, was implemented to record which VM’s data currently reside in 
the cache and to determine when a wait is necessary. 
 
Function contextSwitch(DomX,DomY) { // from DomX to DomY 
If Main_T  > Cache_T 
waitCache(); return; 
} EndFunction 
Algorithm 1. Pseudo-code for tainting domain with cache data. 
The outcome of Algorithm 1, is that a cache wait occurs only when a context switch changes from one domain to 
another where the second domain has the ability to establish a side-channel with the first. Allowing a wait only in a 
single condition ensures the usefulness of cache, decrease the cost and prevent the data lose. At present Algorithm 1 
is quite conservative and does not distinguish between the Prime and Probe steps of a side-channel attack. In 
practice, a wait would only be necessary before the Probe step, which could be recorded in the scheduler by further 
tainting. Theoretically, this would further reduce the overhead of this algorithm by at least 75 percentages but is left 
by the authors for future work. 
5.4. Statistical Analysis 
Table 1. Flush and Wait function required with respect to the type of data accessed.  
Data Type Flush() Wait() 
Same N N 
Different Y N 
Both 
Idle 
Y 
N 
Y 
N 
 
The type of data accessed by the VM’s in every cycle can be any of the four in Table 1. Hence it is clear that out 
of four cases, Cache-Wait function needed only in a single case where as Cache-Flush function needed in two cases. 
 
   Fig. 4. Frequency of type of data accessed by VM’s.                           Fig. 5. Comparison of use of flush() and Wait(). 
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 The type of data accessed by VM’s varies with respect to the number of interfering VM’s. The analysis was 
conducted by considering 40 cycles of data access from each Virtual Machine. From Fig 4., it can be concluded that 
the number of access for different data is increased with the increase in VM’s interfering. Hence the function Cache-
Flush will increase accordingly as shown in Fig 5. The Cache-Wait function which applied only in a single case can 
effectively overcome the drawbacks of the Cache-Flush, like reduced usefulness of the cache, increased cost and 
data lose. 
6. Conclusion and Future Work 
Two unique security attributes of the cloud motivated this research. First, the cloud’s architecture is particularly 
susceptible to cache-based side-channel attacks. Second, such attacks in the cloud cannot be solved by conventional 
means without interfering with the cloud model. To address these problems, we have developed a new techniques 
designed to prevent cache-based side-channels which is dealing with sequential side-channels. This technique can be 
implemented without interfering the cloud methods of operation. Our solution is unique in that it both addresses 
cache-based side-channels in the Cloud and does not interfere with the Cloud model (requires no changes to the 
client-side code, nor to the underlying hardware). The time information parameter leakage is one of the biggest 
threads in cloud environment. Using PTP technique we have investigated this information leakage through cache-
based side channel attack and explored the drawbacks in existing solution. Later we proposed effective methodology 
which can overcome the drawbacks of existing solution. Statistical analysis presented in this paper demonstrated 
that the suggested algorithm is efficient. The future plan is to implement this approach in real- time environment and 
in the Docker. 
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